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european Court of huMan 
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Indefinite Retention of  
DnA samples Violates the Right  
to Privacy
The Grand Chamber decided unani-
mously in S. and Marper v. the U.K. that 
there are limits on the use of modern tech-
nologies in criminal justice systems. The 
U.K. government set out on a path to build 
an extensive database of DNA samples, 
DNA profiles and fingerprints in order to 
fight crime more effectively. According 
to the Criminal Justice and Police Act of 
2001, the police had a right to collect, and 
retain indefinitely, fingerprints and DNA 
samples from anybody under investiga-
tion. At the time of the December 4, 2008 
judgment, the government had the DNA 
profiles of 4.5 million persons on file.
The government kept DNA profiles 
from both petitioners in the case, even 
though criminal investigations were even-
tually terminated. S., a juvenile, was 
charged with attempted robbery but was 
acquitted on trial. Marper was charged 
with harassment but reconciled with his 
partner, and charges were not pressed. 
They both unsuccessfully applied for their 
private data to be destroyed. The U.K.’s 
highest court decided that mere retention 
of fingerprints and DNA samples did not 
constitute an interference with the right to 
privacy.
The European Court disagreed, and 
pointed to the highly personal nature of 
DNA samples, which contained sensitive 
information about an individual. The same 
applied to DNA profiles from which infor-
mation such as a person’s ethnic origin 
can be determined, as well as fingerprints 
which allow precise identification of a 
person. Consequently, simple storing of 
such data must be justified in terms of 
paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
The crux of the case laid in balancing 
the petitioners’ privacy interests with the 
state’s legitimate goal of preventing crime. 
The outcome of the case was practically 
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decided when the Court stated that the 
margin of appreciation, that is a degree of 
deference accorded to national authorities, 
in this case was narrow because of the 
fundamental importance of the protection 
of personal data for enjoyment of private 
life. It also relied on the common standard 
among European states, none of which 
allowed for indefinite retention of this type 
of data regardless of the seriousness of 
the crime. Framing the issue in this way, 
the Court had no problem declaring that 
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of 
the data retention powers struck an unfair 
balance between the competing public and 
private interests, and therefore violated 
Article 8 of the Convention.
The Court may have too quickly dis-
missed the U.K.’s argument that compari-
sons with other European countries were 
not of much relevance because the U.K. has 
led the vanguard in developing the use of 
DNA samples to detect crime. Yet poten-
tially, the most important pronouncement 
in the case was that “any [s]tate claiming 
a pioneer role in the development of new 
technologies bears special responsibility 
for striking the right balance [between 
competing public and private interests].” 
The Court thus put a heavy burden of proof 
on pioneering states. The U.K. government 
responded to the judgment by announcing 
plans to vary the timescale of retaining 
DNA evidence based on the seriousness 
of the offense, and possibly the age of and 
risk posed by the individual.
states Must Fight Internet  
Crime Effectively
The Court explored the limits of ano-
nymity on the internet in K.U. v. Finland. 
The case involved an advertisement of a 
sexual nature featuring a 12 year old boy 
on an internet dating site. The father of the 
boy asked the police to identify the person 
in order to bring charges. Despite the fact 
that the posting of the ad was a crime, 
the service provider refused to disclose 
information about the perpetrator, as it 
considered itself bound by the confidenti-
ality of telecommunications as provided by 
Finnish law. The boy claimed in his appli-
cation to the Court that his private life was 
affected by the advertisement and that the 
state did not effectively protect him by not 
being able to prosecute the perpetrators.
It is no longer disputed that under the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
there are positive obligations for states 
arising from effective protection of private 
life of its inhabitants. This includes an obli-
gation to protect persons under the state’s 
jurisdiction from interferences into private 
life by third parties. 
As the government demonstrated that 
other remedies were available to the appli-
cant, such as civil damages from the ser-
vice provider, the crucial question was 
whether the incident required a criminal 
response. The government argued that the 
advertisement was a minor crime and so it 
had the authority to give precedence to free 
speech and anonymity on the internet. 
The Court disagreed in a unanimous 
decision on December 2, 2008. Even 
though states are free to choose the means 
by which to ensure respect for private 
life, grave interferences require an effec-
tive response. Considering the applicant’s 
young age and vulnerability, the Court 
stressed the seriousness of the offense, 
which constituted a potential threat to his 
physical and mental welfare. The Conven-
tion requires states to implement a system 
that effectively deters the sexual abuse of 
children because of the abhorrence of such 
a wrongdoing. Even though the posting of 
such an ad was a crime, its deterrent effect 
was seriously reduced by the legislation 
that made it practically impossible for the 
police to identify the perpetrator. Thus, the 
Finnish legislation violated Article 8 of the 
Convention by protecting the anonymity of 
internet users in such cases.
The Court acknowledged that freedom 
of speech and protection of privacy of inter-
net users is important, but not absolute. It 
must yield on occasion to other legitimate 
imperatives, such as the prevention of dis-
order and crime, or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. The Court 
apparently had little sympathy with such 
an exercise of freedom of speech, which it 
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described as reprehensible. The judgment 
serves as an important guidance for states 
trying to balance the privacy of internet 
users with other legitimate aims. 
states Free to Restrict Wearing of 
Religious symbols
The Grand Chamber of the Court upheld 
a ban on headscarves at Turkish universi-
ties in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. In the 2005 
opinion, the majority ruled that such a 
ban violated neither the right to freedom 
of religion nor the right to education of 
the students. The judgment was widely 
criticized as being too deferential to the 
state. A blanket ban aimed at defending 
the secularity of the state and protection of 
women from external pressures seemed to 
be disproportionate in the case of mature 
university students. In the subsequent case 
of Köse and Others v. Turkey, the Court 
similarly held that a ban on wearing head-
scarves at secondary schools did not vio-
late the European Convention on Human 
Rights because it protected adolescents at 
an impressionable age. In a series of cases 
in the autumn of 2008 against France, the 
Court confirmed its strong deference to 
states regarding restrictions on wearing 
religious symbols. 
In the identical cases of Dogru v. 
France and Kervanci v. France, the Court 
indirectly examined the French legislation 
that prohibits wearing religious symbols in 
all primary and secondary public schools. 
The applicants were 11 and 12 year old 
children who were expelled from school 
because they repeatedly refused to take 
off their headscarves in physical education 
classes. On December 4, 2008, the Court 
found that such an interference with their 
freedom of religion did not overstep the 
margin of appreciation of the state.
In view of the young age of the appli-
cants and the need to protect them and 
other children from external pressures, 
the outcome of the judgment seems to be 
correct. Yet, the Court’s heavy reliance on 
the protection of secularism as a justifica-
tion for the ban is troubling. Without more 
careful scrutiny into whether the measures 
in question were really necessary, and 
a clear elaboration of what secularism 
means, there is a risk of states placing 
overly broad restrictions on the freedom of 
religion in the name of secularism. 
The Court’s unwillingness to scruti-
nize more closely restrictions on wearing 
religious symbols is exemplified by the 
Court’s decision in Mann Singh v. France 
on November 13, 2008. Mr. Singh, a 
practicing Sikh, refused to take off his 
turban for his driver’s license photograph 
as required by a 2004 law. All his previous 
driver’s license pictures showed him in a 
turban. The Court found the application 
inadmissible. It ruled that such an interfer-
ence with his freedom of religion was justi-
fied because bareheaded photographs were 
needed by the authorities in charge of pub-
lic safety and law and order, particularly in 
the context of checks carried out under the 
road traffic regulations.
To dismiss the case as manifestly ill-
founded in one paragraph seems to be 
too superficial. Many questions were left 
unanswered, such as whether a photograph 
without a turban would really be more 
effective, as such an individual would 
likely be wearing one when stopped by 
police. Why is a bareheaded picture so 
necessary now when it was not in the past? 
These are certainly issues that deserved a 
careful consideration at the merits stage. 
As demonstrated by these cases, the 
Court’s position seems to be that unless 
manifestly unreasonable or disproportion-
ate, states enjoy considerable leeway in 
restricting the public exercise of religion. 
inter-aMeriCan systeM
IACHR Demands the Protection of 
Human Rights Defenders in Valle 
Jaramillo and others v. Colombia
On November 27, 2008 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Court) 
decided the case of Valle Jaramillo and 
others v. Colombia. In that decision, the 
Court’s finding of violations of a number 
of rights in the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Convention) in relation 
to the 1998 murder of a prominent human 
rights defender served as a stern warn-
ing to Colombia to take the protection 
of human rights defenders seriously. The 
decision comes amidst a flurry of interna-
tional attention critiquing Colombia’s poor 
human rights record. 
Valle Jaramillo was killed in Febru-
ary 1998 when anonymous gunmen broke 
into his office and shot him in the head. 
Some of his family members were forcibly 
detained and threatened during the attack 
and suffered intimidation for many years 
afterward. Prior to his death, Valle Jara-
millo spoke out against the criminal activi-
ties of paramilitary and security forces in 
Antioquia Department, which at that time 
was governed by current Colombian Presi-
dent Alvaro Uribe. According to the Com-
mission, the execution of Valle Jaramillo 
was not an isolated incident, but occurred 
within a context of systematic persecution 
of human rights defenders and a general 
lack of protective measures and safeguards. 
In the decade since the incident, Colombia 
sentenced three civilians in absentia but 
failed to initiate a criminal investigation 
into the responsibility of security forces. 
The incident carries significant political 
relevance in light of allegations by local 
media that Uribe was complicit in oppo-
sition massacres in Antioquia while he 
served as governor. 
The Court considered alleged violations 
of the rights to life (Article 4), humane 
treatment and personal integrity (Article 
5), personal liberty (Article 7), a fair trial 
(Article 8), honor and dignity (Article 11), 
freedom of thought and expression (Article 
13), protection of the family (Article 17), 
freedom of movement and residence (Arti-
cle 22), and judicial protection (Article 
25), in regards to Valle Jaramillo and his 
family members. The state of Colombia 
issued a partial admission of responsibility 
for some of the alleged violations, recog-
nizing that it had failed to fulfill its duty 
to guarantee many of the rights allegedly 
violated. Despite accepting this partial 
admission, the Court exercised its discre-
tion to make a determination on the merits 
of the case. 
The Court found that the state violated 
the rights of Valle Jaramillo and his fam-
ily, including some rights beyond the scope 
of Colombia’s admission. In particular, 
Colombia violated Valle Jaramillo’s rights 
to personal liberty, personal integrity, and 
life by failing to fulfill its responsibility 
to protect human rights defenders in the 
face of real, immediate, and avoidable 
risk. In addition, and beyond the scope 
of the state’s admission, the Court found 
that the State violated Valle Jaramillo’s 
family members’ rights to freedom of 
movement because they were forced to 
live outside their home country due to fear 
of persecution. Furthermore, the Court 
found a violation of judicial protections 
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and fair trial rights of the family members 
because the investigation and prosecutions 
were ineffective. The prolonged period of 
proceedings resulted in convictions of only 
three civilians who were not even within 
the custody of Colombian authorities, and 
consequently, were not serving any sen-
tence. The Court awarded compensatory 
damages of around $215,000 USD and 
demanded that the state ensure the security 
of family members and conduct an expedi-
ent investigation into state responsibility 
for the murder. 
Court Rebuffs Venezuelan  
Judicial Ethics, and Venezuela 
Rejects the Ruling
The Court issued judgment in the mat-
ter of Apitz Barbera et al v. Venezuela on 
August 5, 2008. The judgment surrounded 
a controversial action taken by a Venezu-
elan court in October 2003. At that time, 
a disciplinary body removed three judges 
from Venezuela’s First Court of Admin-
istrative Disputes for the allegedly errone-
ous granting of an amparo remedy, or a 
protection of a constitutional right, against 
an administrative act. The disempowered 
judges contended that their dismissal was 
motivated by ideology and that they were 
denied access to the procedures through 
which they could effectively contest their 
removal. They alleged that Venezuela 
had not sufficiently informed them of the 
grounds for dismissal, had not provided 
access to a hearing by a competent and 
impartial tribunal, and had not protected 
their due process guarantees. 
The Venezuelan government estab-
lished the disciplinary body that removed 
the judges during the 1999 constitutional 
transition and the adoption into force of the 
Bolivarian Constitution. With jurisdiction 
over administrative issues, the First Court 
ruled unanimously to grant a precaution-
ary application for protection from an 
administrative act, and was charged by the 
disciplinary body with having committed 
an inexcusable judicial error. Accordingly, 
the sanction of removal was imposed upon 
the entire bench of that case. Two of the 
judges brought challenges to their dismissal 
based on lack of jurisdiction and an appeal 
for a constitutional protection and annul-
ment. The amparo protection was denied 
to the two judges, and the annulment had 
not yet been reviewed on the merits. The 
judges subsequently brought the case to 
the Inter-American Commission, where it 
progressed to the Inter-American Court.
The Court found that Venezuela had not 
secured the rights of the judges to impartial 
hearings and to knowledge of the grounds 
for their dismissal. The Court also found 
that, with regard to the two judges who 
had attempted domestic proceedings, the 
State violated the right to be heard within 
a reasonable time and the right to effective 
recourse. The Court ordered that Venezu-
ela reinstate the three judges into positions 
of equivalent stature and that it ensure the 
expeditious passage of a national code of 
judicial ethics. 
Although the Court’s decision made a 
strong statement on the importance of judi-
cial ethics, the Venezuelan Supreme Court 
officially rejected the ruling. The Supreme 
Court accused the Inter-American Court of 
usurping the State’s powers and of unac-
ceptably intervening in domestic proceed-
ings. According to the Supreme Court, 
undermining the firmness of the decisions 
against the ex-judges could lead to insti-
tutional chaos. Amnesty International has 
said that the Supreme Court’s ruling sends 
a dangerous message that human rights 
are optional. It remains unclear if or when 
the Inter-American Court will exercise its 
mandate to monitor compliance with the 
judgment.
Court Emphasizes state’s  
Duty to Investigate in Tiu Tojin  
v. Guatemala
In its decision of November 26, 2008 
in the case of Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, the 
Court reinforced the responsibility of states 
to investigate crimes and end impunity. 
The case concerned the forced disappear-
ance of Maria Tiu Tojin and her daughter, 
Josefa, which took place in 1990 as part of 
a systemic conflict between military forces 
and Mayan indigenous communities. The 
Court held that Guatemala violated the 
rights of Tiu Tojin, including the rights to 
life (Article 4), humane treatment (Article 
5), personal liberty (Article 7), fair trial 
(Article 8) and judicial protection (Article 
25). Additionally, the Court found that 
Guatemala violated the rights of children 
(Article 19) with regards to Tiu Tojin’s 
daughter, and breached its legal responsi-
bilities of fair process and judicial protec-
tion in relation to Tiu Tojin’s other family 
members. 
The state of Guatemala displayed a 
positive and cooperative attitude towards 
the case and officially recognized its inter-
national responsibility for violating each 
of the rights alleged. The Court noted that 
Guatemala formally apologized, erected a 
monument in memory of Tiu Tojin, issued 
compensation to relatives, and reimbursed 
costs associated with the proceedings at the 
Commission level. 
Notwithstanding the state’s positive 
contribution, however, the Court pro-
ceeded to make a determination of the facts 
of the disappearance. The Court found that 
the arrest and disappearance of Tiu Tojin 
and her daughter were motivated by their 
indigenous Mayan identity. As a result 
of the internal armed conflict which took 
place from 1962 through 1996, displaced 
Mayan families, including Tiu Tojin and 
her daughter, were forced into the moun-
tains where many were later arrested and 
detained by state security forces. Some 
were transferred to displaced-person 
camps, but many were disappeared in this 
process for suspected guerilla involve-
ment. The specific fate of Tiu Tojin and 
her daughter is unclear. 
Following this determination of the truth 
of the situation, the Court highlighted that 
the investigation and prosecution of those 
responsible was severely prolonged; no 
significant progress was made in over six-
teen years. Although Guatemala asserted 
that the complexity of the case, rather 
than inaction or unwillingness, caused this 
delay, the Court emphasized the legal 
obligations of Guatemala to combat impu-
nity despite the difficulties in investigat-
ing these complicated crimes. The Court 
ordered Guatemala to not only investigate 
the events that led to the violations and to 
identify and prosecute those responsible, 
but also to conduct a search for the persons 
or remains of Tiu Tojin and her daughter.
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